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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
An experiment was performed on the Cornfield System in which the 
effects of varying degrees of human intervention on various CIC 
functions were studied. Target load was also a variable. Because of 
certain similarities between this and an earlier experiment done with 
a fully manual CIC, it was possible to make some comparisons between 
the automatic system, of which Cornfield is a prototype, and a more 
conventional CIC.
Subjects in the studies were experienced naval personnel. The 
experiment consisted of a total of 52 half-hour runs and measures of 
system performance, recorded by ILLIAC, included observations of weapon 
assignment and de-assignment and records of target kills. Battle 
problems, or scripts, contained high-speed (450-650 knots), single 
raids which reached peak simultaneous loads of 5 or 10, depending on 
the script used. The kill criterion, applied by ILLIAC, was a five- 
mile offset between interceptor and target. Killed targets were faded 
from displays automatically.
The experimenters framed four general questions (see Introduction) 
and some of these may be tentatively answered. First, it has been 
shown that the Cornfield System can perform a type of air defense mission 
in a "hands-off" manner. Further, in the present experiment, the system's 
record without human participation was as good, or better, as other modes 
of operation in which people had decision responsibilities. Second, 
nothing definite can be said with respect to dividing system functions 
between men and machines* However, the study did demonstrate that some 
heretofore traditionally human tasks (eg. threat evaluation) could be 
turned over to computers with no loss in overall performance. Third, 
the effects of increased target load influenced the system's operation 
in the expected direction. That is, heavy load reduced kill ranges, 
increased the number of "hits" suffered, decreased survival time, and so 
on. Most measures were influenced proportionally with target density. 
Finally, it was evident that the Cornfield System did bring about 
considerable improvement in air defense capability over a conventional 
CIC.
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Following is a more specific summary of the results of the experiment.
1. Overall air defense performance of Cornfield was high and the 
influence of human intervention negligible. Under heavy load the system 
suffered hits about once per run (out of a possible 10 targets programmed 
to bomb the ship); the corresponding figure for light load scripts was an 
average of 0.25 hits per run.
2. Penetration of a 50-mile defended zone around the ship was 
greater under heavy load conditions— k targets per run as opposed to 1 in 
light load. There was some indication that the "hands-off" mode of operat­
ing Cornfield was more efficient than the modes in which humans performed 
certain decision functions.
5. Range of target kills was greater under light load by about 
8 miles. Differences between the various intervention modes were slight 
although, in the heavy load condition, performance tended to be better at 
the "hands-off" end of the continuum. Also, there was greater variability, 
in terms of the kill range criterion, for the more automatic modes; con­
versely, when the system was operated with greater dependence on human 
participation there was more consistency in this measure.
k. The number of assignment of weapons to targets was greater 
under the automatic than in the more manual modes. This effect was true 
for both target load conditions, although the absolute number of assign­
ments was related to the number of targets present. In terms of this 
measure there was much greater variability in the automatic modes (i.e. 
when all weapon assignments were made by the computer) than when assign­
ments were originated by CIC Officers.
5. In the mode which permitted either men or computers to 
assign weapons, there appeared to be an interaction effect with target load. 
That is, the men did relatively more assigning under heavy load than they 
did when the going was easy. This effect was also evident with respect to 
kills following assignments: under light load the officers made 55 % >  
of the assignments preceding kills and in the heavy load the figure was 
65 % ♦
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6. Survival time, or the number of minutes of operation before
suffering the first bombing, differed only slightly between the different 
intervention modes. Target load did affect this measure in the expected 
direction: survival time was greater under lighter loads. There was
also greater variability in the manual modes than when the more automatic 
conditions were operating.
7. Because of certain limiting factors, only tentative state­
ments may be made regarding the comparison of Cornfield and a manual 
system. Following are some of these:
a. Air defense by Cornfield was superior in terms of hits 
suffered. Under comparable load conditions the 
average numbers of bombings per run were 2.7 and 0.9 
for the manual system and Cornfield, respectively.
b. Cornfield was more effective in terms of minimizing 
50-mile penetrations than the manual system.
c. Average range of killed targets was higher in Cornfield 
than in the manual system.
d. There was close agreement between the manual system and
the two Cornfield modes requiring human weapon assign­
ments in terms of one measure: ratio of assignments to
kills.
e. All modes of Cornfield survived slightly longer than 
the manual system.
8. CIC Officers predictions of target positions, made as 
"closest point of approach" (CPA) reports, were most frequent in the 
"hands-off" mode. Accuracy of these predictions was similar for the 
four intervention modes. There was some evidence that the officer sub­
jects differed in this ability; also, predictions improved with practice. 
Compared with CPA predictions made in the manual system, Cornfield CIC 
Officers made more reports per run, but the positional errors were greater*
9. Differences between the two officer subjects were negligible
for all but one measure: hits suffered. In the latter, one officer
averaged 0.75 hits per run, the second averaged 0.55*
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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BACKGROUND
Five years ago Professor Nordsieck, of this laboratory, proposed an 
automatic information processing and control system vhieh would handle 
certain aspects of naval operations. The system, now known as Cornfield, 
originally had as its basic element a special purpose computer to receive, 
correlate, and disseminate radar target information. Subsequent devel­
opments of this proposal have added a general purpose computer to perform 
automatic threat evaluation, weapon allocation, and weapon control. The 
overall application of these functions is immediately relevant to the Navy’s 
CIC which, traditionally, has been a manual or human system. The Nordsieck 
proposal, when followed through, would result in an almost fully automatic 
system with very little reliance on human components.
Equipments for the Cornfield System were completed in the Fall of 
1956. Since that time checkouts and preliminary tests have been conducted 
and programs for the general purpose computer have been written. (Appendix 
A contains a brief description of the Cornfield System and Appendix B is 
a resume of the ICON II control program.) The present report describes 
one of a series of experimental studies intended to provide a type of eval­
uation of the system as well as a more fundamental understanding of large 
automatic man-machine complexes. The principal questions framed by the 
experimenters were:
First— can Cornfield, incorporating the ICON II program, be operated 
in an essentially "hands-off" manner as a threat-evaluator, weapons- 
assigner, weapons-controller?
Second— in a simulated air defense situation, can the system’s perfor­
mance be improved by the addition of men to handle certain of the decision 
functions? Which system functions, such as threat evaluation or weapon 
control, are best handled by the computers and which by the men?
Third— what are the effects of varying levels of target density on 
Cornfield performance? Do certain functions suffer more than others as 
a result of increased numbers of targets?
Fourth— what order of improvement, or decrement, does Cornfield 
provide over a conventional, manually operated CIC? In other words, what 
can the services expect to get for their investments in automatic data- 
processing systems of this type?
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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METHOD
Purpose. The purpose of the Artful experiment was to assess, under 
varying degrees of automatieity, the Cornfield System’s capability to 
perform threat evaluation, weapon allocation, and weapon control. 
Concomitant with the assessment, the effects of human intervention in 
the system were studied. Performance of Cornfield was measured in terms 
of several criteria of air defense as well as internal measures of system 
behavior.
Intervention Mode I. Human intervention was systematically varied 
along a four-step continuum ranging from a virtually fully automatic 
system to a system in which men performed all decision-making and control 
functions. At the most completely automatic or "hands-off" end of the 
continuum, Cornfield was operated with a minimal amount of human partici­
pation.* All decision and control functions were performed by the 
computers: threat evaluation, weapon selection and assignment, de-assign­
ment and re-assignment, and weapon control (vectoring of interceptors). 
This method of operation will be referred to as Mode I.
Intervention Mode II. Mode II was identical in structure to the 
"hands-off" mode with the exception that CIC Officers and their assistants 
could intervene in any of the automatic functions of the system. For 
example, the men could assign weapons without waiting for the automatic 
elements of the system to do this. Or, the officers could, at their 
discretion, undo assignments made by the computer. Also, once assign­
ments had been made, the officers could manually vector interceptors by 
voice link to the pilots. Finally, other more typically human, and 
subtler, interventions might include re-orienting orbit stations of
* The only task which the computers were not programmed to handle was the 
re-identification of "lost" tracks. This was a low probability event, 
occurring about once every two to three runs, in which a target became 
disassociated in the tracking computer from its storage location. Upon 
perceiving a "lost" target CIC Officers re-identified them via instruc­
tions to the keyset operator member of the crew.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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interceptors, placement of interceptors to perform guard functions, 
and the conduct of sequenced interceptions "by single sections of fighters.
All human interventions were entered via the manually operated keyset.
Intervention Mode III. The third method— Mode III— required the men to 
do all threat evaluations, weapon selection, and weapon assignment. The 
computers were used only to track targets and, once weapons had "been 
paired with raids, to vector interceptors. The same types of interventions 
mentioned earlier could he done in Mode III.
Intervention Mode IV. Mode IV, at the least automatic end of the 
continuum, was manual in that humans had to make all decisions from threat 
evaluation to vectoring of interceptors. The computers did only the 
detection, tracking* display, and posting of status information. (Also, 
as will be described more fully later, the computer elements refereed 
interceptions in each of the four modes and all observations were made and 
recorded by ILLIAC.)
Cornfield vs. Manual System. A subsidiary purpose of the experiment
was to compare performance of Cornfield with a present-day, small ship CIC
operated in the conventional manual method. This aim of the experiment
was approximated by comparison of various criteria obtained with measures*of a manually operated CIC at the Naval Research Laboratory* Both systems—  
Cornfield as well as the manual CIC— had identical air defense missions, 
were subjected to the same battle problem, and had similar measures made 
of their performance.
System Mission. The task of the system was air defense of a single 
ship. Three sections of interceptors-^-combat air patrol (CAP)— were the
* See Chauvette, L. M., Sinaiko, H. W., and Buckley, E. P. Simulation 
Studies of CIC: Air Defense Performance as a Criterion of System Effective­
ness . URL Report 5003, September 1957, Confidential.
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defending weapons. Crews were told that a 50-mile zone surrounding their 
ship was to he kept clear of hostile aircraft and that any raid reaching 
10 miles could he presumed to have scored a direct hit on the ship.
The interception criterion was a five-mile offset of CAP from 
target, at any approach angle. Kill prohahility was 1.00 and limiting 
factors of fuel, ammunition, oxygen, weather, and altitude were not 
present•
Target Generation. Two types of aircraft were generated. The first, 
consisting of maneuverable aircraft which simulated CAP, were produced 
hy standard Navy 15-J-1C target generators modified to include displays 
of control orders generated hy the computer. Each of the three simulated 
friendly friendly aircraft was "flown" hy a technician who responded to 
control orders, either from the computer or the air control officer 
depending upon the intervention mode being used. Interceptor aircraft 
were flown at two speeds: 400 knots during orbiting and retura-to-
station periods and 600 knots during interceptions. (During conditions 
of intervention by the crew, these speeds could he varied although 600 
knots was the maximum.) All turns were done at 2°/sec. Figure 1 shows 
15-J-1C target generators in use.
The second type of target was the group of aircraft used to simulate 
hostile planes or raids. These were preprogrammed, i.e., flew pre­
determined tracks, and they were generated hy a punched paper tape input 
to the tracking computer (TASC). Figure 2 shows the type of tape input 
and tape reader which were used.
Radar Problems. A single basic problem or script was used through­
out the experiment to provide hostile targets with which the system had 
to contend. The script was essentially identical with that used in the 
manual CIC experiments at Naval Research Laboratory. Two versions of the 
basic script were created: one heavy load and the other light load.
The script was 50 minutes in duration and, in its full or heavy load 
version, contained 22 targets. Ten of the targets were "critical" in 
that they were programmed to enter both the 50- and 10-mile zones
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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Figure I. Generation of friendly aircraft* "pilots" manning modified
15—J — IC simulators.
Figure 2. Generation of hostile a ircraft* paper tape and 
tape reader.
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around the ship. Target speeds were constant for each aircraft and 
these ranged between 4-50 and 650 knots. The radar surveillance area 
was set at 100 miles and targets appeared initially at ranges between 
45 and 95 miles. Quality of radar information was not a variable of 
the experiment so that all targets had blip-scan ratios of 1.00. The 
average number of targets being tracked by the system was 10, although 
this figure was lower during the first four minutes of raid build-up.
The light load version of the heavy load script was created by 
eliminating every other target and resulted in a battle problem of 
the same duration (30 minutes) containing a total of 10 raids (5 
critical and 5 non-critical).
In order to prevent recognition of the scripts by crew members 
(who were not told that any problems would be repeated), eight equiva­
lent forms of the heavy and light load scripts were built. Equivalent 
forms were achieved in three ways: 1. Script orientations were rotated,
i.e. track patterns rotated by 90°, l80°, and 270° increments; 2. 
tracks originating in certain 90° sectors were interchanged; 3* drum 
address (i.e. storage location in the tracking computer) was different 
for each track in each version of the basic script.
Figure 3 shows the history of the tracks for the heavy load script.
Figure 4 is a time profile of target events, i.e. entries, turns, fades,
#and splits, as well as target load.
Subjects. The Cornfield System was operated with the minimum 
crew size possible under each of the four intervention modes. During 
intervention Mode I runs only the CIC Officer and keyset operator were 
present. In Modes II, III, and IV there was also an Assistant CIC 
Officer whose responsibility was to maintain identities of interceptors 
and, in Mode IV only, to do manual vectoring of fighters as a conventional 
air controller. Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 show an overall view of the 
system and close-ups of the three operator stations, respectively.
* loc. cit.
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Figure 3. Hostile air target configuration. (Heavy load script)
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Figure 5. Overall arrangement of operator stations in Cornfield.
Keyset operator, C IC  o ffice r, and assistant C IC  
officer (left to right)
Figure 6. C lose-up of C I  C officer station.
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Figure 7. C lose-up of assistant C IC  o fficer station
FIG. 8. Close-up of Keyset Operator Station.
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Subjects were three Navy people, all members of the instructional*staff of the University of Illinois Naval R.O.T.C. group. The keyset 
operator billet was filled by a first class petty officer (Fire Control 
Technician) and the CIC Officer and Assistant CIC Officer billets were 
filled by the two officers, a lieutenant and a lieutenant (j.g.). The 
latter officers alternated in the two billets.
Because of the relatively unique character of the Cornfield System, 
and particularly its display and keyset stations, subjects were trained 
for about six weeks before any actual data-taking runs were begun.
Training included overall familiarization with the system and its equip­
ment as well as a series of practice runs on very low load scripts.
Experimental Design. In addition to the major independent variable—  
four conditions or degrees of human intervention— three other variables 
were systematically varied. Two different radar problems— a light and 
heavy load script--were used to determine the effects of target density 
on system performance under each intervention mode. Also, by alternating 
the two officer subjects in the CIC Officer and Assistant CIC Officer . 
billets, two "crews" were used. Finally, to measure practice effects 
or performance differences as a function of experience, the sixteen unique 
conditions (four modes, two scripts, two crews) were repeated once. These 
two "time blocks" made a grand total of 32 runs.
The sixteen conditions were assigned within each "time block" in 
a random order.
Measurement of System Performance. A special program, Data Obtain­
ing Program (Evaluation)(DOPE), was written so that, with one exception, 
all measures of the Cornfield System’s behavior could be made automatically 
and reliably.
Two major classes of events occurred in the system. These were
* We wish to express our appreciation to Col. B. C. Batterton, USMC, and 
Cdr. J. M. Mason, USN, Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, of the 
N.R.O.T.C. unit for their cooperation in making staff members available 
as subjects.
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assignments — any pairing of an interceptor and a target--and de-assignments 
— which, were un-pairings due to any of eight reasons.
The DOPE program recorded the following information about assignments:
1 . time of assignment (in 15-sec. intervals)
2. identity of target aircraft
5. identity of friendly interceptor aircraft
4. position of interceptor at time of assignment (in x, y)
5. source of decision to assign (either "man” or ’’computer")
In addition to the above information, de-assignment records also 
included the reasons for de-assignments, eg. kill, re-assignment of inter­
ceptor, etc. (A detailed description of DOPE will be published as part of CSL 
Report R-106).
One type of system performance measure was recorded manually. CIC 
Officers had, as a secondary task, instructions to estimate "closest points 
of approach" and times of CPA on targets they considered threatening.
These CPA estimates were reported by telephone to a staff observer who kept 
a written record.
At the end of each run in the laboratory a paper tape record, contain­
ing a chronological history of DOPE observations, was printed. This per­
mitted experimenters the opportunity to keep current the day-to-day details 
of the systems’s performance. Figure 9 is part of a typical DOPE print­
out following one run.
In addition to the chronological summaries printed, DOPE information 
was re-entered into ILLIAC and the data sorted to facilitate statistical 
analysis. Four "sorts" were made with data from each run as follows:
1. Sorter "A" - summary of "kills" including a chronological listing 
of all killed targets, time of kill, range at kill, an overall average 
(mean) kill range, and a measure of disperion (standard deviation) around 
the average.
2. Sorter "B" - chronological listing of all assignments and de­
assignments by each target identity.
5. Sorter "C" - chronological listing of all assignments and de- 
assignments by interceptor identity.
4. Sorter "D" - summary and tabulation of all de-assignments by 
reason for de-assignment.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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RESULTS: I. EFFECTS OF HUMAN INTERVENTION
Air Defense. In terms of overall air defense capability, there vere 
virtually no differences between the four modes of operating Cornfield.
With or without human intervention the system performed its mission with a 
high degree of success. With respect to weapon assignments, 100 °/o of all 
critical targets* drew assignments in Modes II, III, and IV and 95 °/o of 
all criticáis were assigned in the most completely automatic condition,
Mode I. These figures were identical for both light and heavy raid problems.
Perhaps a more significant measure of air defense is the record of 
killed critical targets or its converse, "hits suffered" because of failure 
to intercept. Table 1 summarizes this measure for each of the experimental 
conditions.
Table 1
Hits Suffered Per Run: Means and Standard Deviations
LOAD I
INTERVENTION MODE 
II III IV COMBINED
X 0.5 0.0 0.25 0.25 0.25
LIGHT
0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
X 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.25 0.9
HEAVY
0 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.6
The single best combination of men and machines appears to have been 
Mode II which fought perfect battles under light load and averaged only 
one hit every other run under heavy load. (Mode II was the fully automatic
* Critical targets are those raids— 10 under heavy load and 5 under light 
which were programmed to "bomb" the ship.
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condition in which crews were permitted to intervene in any manner they 
chose•)
Another index of how well the system performed its mission is 
penetration of the 30-mile defense zone surrounding the ship, (in 
addition to its major task of keeping raids from reaching the 10-mile 
lethal zone, Cornfield had as a secondary task the protection of a 
circle of 30-miles radius.) Table 2 shows this measure summarized for 
each of the experimental conditions.
Table 2
Primary Air Defense: Critical Targets Killed inside 30 Miles
(Means and Standard Deviations)
INTERVENTION MODE -
LOAD I II III IV COMBINED
X 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.8 1.2
LIGHT
a 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.8
X 2.8 4.0 4.5 4.5 3.9
HEAVY
a 2.41 0.9 0.5 1.5 1.7
The effects of target load are more pronounced in the case of this 
measure than for "hits” suffered. That is, all modes were relatively 
more efficient in keeping hostiles outside the 30-mile zone under the 
light load condition than under heavy load. Overall figures (all 
intervention modes combined) for targets killed between 30 and 10 
miles are: 23.8 °/o, light load, and 39»4 °/o, heavy load. (Differ­
ence significant at .02 level, i.e. rejects null hypothesis that 
there is no difference between load levels.)
Perhaps of lesser operational significance are several other 
measures of system performance derived from observations. One of 
these, which is an indication of system efficiency, may be expressed
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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as the ratio of assignments to hills. Table 3 summarizes these indexes 
by intervention mode and target density.
Table 3
Efficiency: Number of Assignments Per Kill (Critical Targets Only)
LOAD I
INTERVENTION MODE 
ÏÎ III IV COMBINED
LIGHT 2.33 I .95 I.I6 1.21 1.46
HEAVY 2.67 2.79 1.44 1.48 2.09
As indicated in Table 3, the principal differences are two: that between
light and heavy load conditions and that between the two automatic modes 
(I and II) and the two modes in which humans had to make all assignments 
(III and IV). In the case of the former, target density appears to 
increase the ratio (in all intervention modes) of assignments to kills 
principally by requiring more assignments to be made as the total number 
of targets to deal with goes up. (This would include relatively more de­
assignments and re-assignments as well.) The second effect--which shows 
higher ratios for the two automatic intervention modes— reflects, probably, 
not so much a real difference between men and machines as it does an arti­
fact of our observing technique. That is, while it was possible to 
record every assignment, de-assignment, and re-assignment made by the 
computer, it was only possible to record actual verbal instructions of 
CIC Officers. Thus, an officer subject could have vacillated between 
two or more possible assignments (eg. "I'll send CAP 05«•••no, maybe I'll 
assign OF....or perhaps 08") but only the actual pairing made by him was 
recorded. In the case of the last hypothetical quotation, had it been 
done in Modes I or II, three assignments would have been tallied for the 
computer. Nevertheless, since each observed assignment represented a 
message transmitted to an interceptor pilot, there is a real difference 
between the frequencies of computer and human decisions of this type.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
C O N F I D E N T I A L 104-25
Range of Kills. Another index of system performance is the range 
(distance from protected point) at which targets were successfully inter­
cepted. Table 4 summarizes kill ranges against critical targets in terms 
of the intervention mode and target density variables.
Table 4
Range of Killed Critical Targets in Miles (Means and Standard
Deviations)
INTERVENTION MODE
LOAD I II III IV COMBINED
X 41.9 40.8 4l.O 38.9 40.5
LIGHT
Ö 4.5 4.1 3.0 6.6 3.9
X 35.2 52.6 29.2 30.9 3I .9
HEAVY
a 5-3 4.4 1.9 1.8 4.2
Two effects are apparent in Table 4. First, average kill range did 
not vary significantly— statistically or practically— as a function of 
the degree of human intervention (modes). This was true for both light 
and heavy target density conditions: under each load level the maximum 
difference between average kill ranges for the best and poorest inter­
vention modes was about 5 miles. The second effect, and in the expected 
direction, was that average kill ranges were greater under light target 
load by amounts ranging from approximately 7 to 12 miles for the four 
modes. These two effects— the relatively greater influence of target 
load on kill range than intervention mode— indicate that both human and 
automatic decision-making were remarkably similar as measured by this 
criterion.
One other point with respect to the kill range criterion is that 
target load had the least influence on performance under the least
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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automatic intervention condition. That is, during Mode IV in which all 
decision and control functions were performed by humans in the system, 
the gain in mean kill range realized by halving the number of critical 
targets was about 7 miles; for each of the other modes (all of which had 
automatic control of interceptors) the average gain under light load 
varied from 8 to 12 miles.
Assignment of Weapons. The number of assignment decisions made, 
under the intervention modes and for the two load levels* is shown in 
Table 5«
Table 5
Number of Target Assignments Per Run (Means and Standard Deviations)
LOAD
INTERVENTION MODE
I II III IV
X
LIGHT
a
19.0 20.0 11.8 11.5  
9.7 7.8 1.9 1.5
X
1 HEAVY
a
1)2.8 53-5 21.3 18.8 
18.9 13 .1 5.8 5.3
Several effects are apparent in the data. First, the influence of 
intervention on the number of assignments made is directly related to 
the use of the computer in this function. That is, the two modes which 
required humans to assign weapons (Modes III and IV) were similar, under 
each target density condition, and showed about 50 °/o fewer assignments 
than were made under the two automatic modes • That is, the men in the 
system— CIC Officers— averaged approximately 12 assignments during each 
light load run; when the computer made assignments— Mode I and II— the 
numbers averaged 19 and 20 under equivalent light load conditions.
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A second effect, in terms of the assignments made, was the overall 
influence of target density. In the two non-automatic conditions (Modes 
III and IV) the average number of weapon assignments increased by factors 
of 1.8 and 1.6, respectively, as the number of targets present doubled. 
However, in Msdes I and II, in which assignments were automatic, increasing 
the number of targets by a factor of 2 caused assignments to increase by 
2.2 and 2.6, respectively. There is, then, an accelerating effect caused 
by increased load for the automatic systems and this acceleration is not 
present when decisions are made by humans.
Still a third phenomenon relating to the weapon assignment measure 
is shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Mode II: Distribution of Weapon Assignments between CIC Officers
and Computers (Means and Standard Deviations)
When Mode II (fully automatic, human intervention permitted) is 
considered separately, the proportion of weapon assignments made by 
men and the computer changed as target load increased. Further, the 
change was not in the expected direction. That is, as load doubled, 
the number of assignments made by men in Mode II increased by a factor 
of 4 while computer assignments approximately doubled. looking at the 
data from another angle, the men tended to make relatively more assign' 
ments when the going got tougher than otherwise. Conversely, during
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light load runs, the CIC Officer subjects were much more willing to have
*the assignments made automatically.
Finally, an additional datum relevant to the way in which humans and 
machines functions were divided during Mode II is shown in Table 7•
Table 7
Interaction of CIC Officers and Computers: Kills Following Assignments
(Mode II)
LOAD
INTERVENTION MODE II 
CIC Officers Computers
LIGHT 
(34 Kills)
35.3 %  64.7 °/o
HEAVY 
(63 Kills)
63.5 %  36.5 °/o
Table 7 shows that, while doubling the target load resulted in approx­
imately twice as many kills for Mode II, the proportion of kills follow­
ing assignments made by the CIC Officers was reversed for the two load 
levels. Thus, under light load the men made about one-third of the 
assignments preceding kills and the computer made two-thirds of the 
assignments; when the target load doubled, the absolute number of kills 
also doubled but the men made two-thirds of the assignments and the 
computer only one-third.
* Although there is no objective evidence to support this, it was 
apparent to the experimenters that, under heavy load, CIC Officers tended 
to behave in a "competing" way with respect to their interactions with 
the computer. When loads were light, the men appeared willing to let the 
computer carry most of the assignment responsibility; when loads were 
heavy, the men much more often stepped in, over-rode the computer, de- 
assigned, and re-assigned interceptors.
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Survival. One measure which is of greater operational interest than 
some of the others reported has been derived from the "hits suffered" 
observations. This is a reflection of "time afloat before taking the 
first bombing" or, more briefly, survival. For each run the number of 
minutes the system operated before being bombed was computed. Unlike 
other measures which were averaged for each condition of the experiment, 
survival is a summation over time. Table 8 shows the mean survival times, 
with dispersion around each mean, for the eight experimental conditions.
Table 8
Survival Time: Minutes Before First Hit
(Means and Standard Deviations)
INTERVENTION MODE
LOAD I II III IV
X 27 .6 30.0 27.5 27.5
LIGHT
0 2.2 0.0 4.5 4.5
X 19*8 22.0 I7 .O 21.3
HEAVY
Cf 5.9 8.2 9.6 9.6
In terms of mean survival time, differences between the four 
intervention modes are slight. The effect of target load increases on 
performance cut survival by 6 to 10 minutes• Under both load conditions 
there was greater variability when the human system elements had decis­
ion responsibilities than when the two automatic modes were run.
(It is likely that, had different instructions been given to the 
officer-subjects, the strategies employed in Modes III and IV would 
have differed. Subjects were not penalized for failing to kill 
critical targets; each run continued the full 30 minutes irrespective 
of whether a bomb had fallen on the ship. However, one may speculate 
on the different way in which the men would have played the game if
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their instructions had emphasized survival; eg. "The run will end when the 
first hit is made on your ship.” The survival measure, under such circum­
stances, might have shown an even greater disparity between human and 
machine mediated combat decisions. The men because of their underlying need 
to survive and fight again, might have sacrificed range for assurance that 
they would not be hit; the computer, failing to perceive a difference between 
being bombed early or late, would have played the same, unvarying game.)
Identification of "Lost” Targets. Due to occasional errors in automatic 
tracking by the TASC computer friendly targets became disassociated from their 
storage locations in the computer. These ”lost” targets appeared as uniden­
tified hostiles on the displays in Cornfield and they continued to be treated 
as such until recognized and re-identified by the CIC Officers. (Re-identi- 
fication was made by ordering fighter pilots to make certain identifying 
maneuvers and corrections were inserted into the computer via the keyset.)
Table 9 shows the frequency with which "lost" targets were identified 
during each condition of the experiment.
Table 9
Identification of "Lost" Friendly Aircraft by CIC Officers (Means)
LOAD
INTERVENTION MODE
I II III IV COMBINED
LIGHT X 0.25 0.0 0.25 0.0 0.15
HEAVY X 1.0 1.5 0.5 0.75 0.94
Target load had the most important effect on this measure although 
the absolute number of re-identifications was low in all of the load inter­
vention mode conditions. During the heavy load runs the two automatic 
modes (I and II) tended to produce more "lost" targets and the need to 
re~identify by CIC Officers.
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RESULTS: II. COMPARISON OF CORNFIELD AND A MANUAL CIC
This chapter is a tentative answer to the question, "What, if 
any, are the advantages gained by automatizing certain traditionally 
human functions of CIC?" It is possible here to infer some things about 
relative performance of the two types of systems for the following reasons. 
First, there is available information obtained in an earlier, but similar, 
experiment done on a conventional CIC . The previous experiment utilized 
a fully mocked-up, manually operated CIC which had the same air defense 
mission as that given to Cornfield in the present study. Second, both 
experiments used an identical battle problem of hostile targets• (The 
NRL study did not vary target load; all runs were made against the heavy 
load script.) Third, similar measures of system behavior were made in 
each experiment. Table 10 summarizes principal similarities and differ­
ences between the two systems and Table 11 shows the measures of perfor­
mance made in each experiment.
A Word of Caution. It is important to emphasize the tentative 
nature of this chapter. For several reasons, a comparison such as the 
one which follows is, at best, a questionable thing. First, the two 
experiments were conducted in different places and at different times•
The NRL study preceded that done at CSL by more than two years. Crews 
were different in each case— for example, CIC Officer-subjects were a 
lieutenant and a commander, at NRL, and a lieutenant and a lieutenant 
(jg.) at CSL.
Second, and perhaps the most limiting inconsistency between the 
studies, is the fact that different kill criteria were used. At NRL 
interceptions were refereed by a member of the experimental staff who 
applied a modified "Fleet Criterion" (fighter within ± 10° of bogey 
heading, within 10 miles, and bearing between 1 and 5 o ’clock or 11 
and 7 o ’clock). The CSL interception criterion, as described in the 
preceding chapter, was applied by ILLIAC and consisted only of a 5- 
mile offset between the interceptor and the raid with which it was 
paired. While the NRL criterion required close control and attention 
to such details as heading and final bearing of fighter from target,
* loc. cit.
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Table 10
Comparison of Manual and Cornfield Systems
MANUAL C-F
Crew CICO, ACO, RCO, CICO
S-B, TRACKER, ACICO
PLOTTER KSO
Tracking HUMAN: DETECTION, 
TRACKING, REPORTING
TA SC
Status Info HUMAN: TOTE BOARD CLEAR-PICTURE
Threat Evaluation HUMAN HUMAN OR COMPUTER
Weapon Assignment HUMAN HUMAN OR COMPUTER
Weapon Control HUMAN HUMAN OR COMPUTER
Table 11
Summary of 1955 and 1958 Experiments: 
Measures of System Performance
1958
CORHTIELD
1955
MANUAL
Front-End: 
Detection, 
Tracking, 
Plotting
Not measured X
Assignments : Time,
Position, Source 
Identity
X X
De-As s ignment s : "KILL" "KILL"
Time, CAP Position + or
Source 7 other "OTHER"
categories only
CICO "CPA" 
Reports X X
Identification of X Not"LOST" CAP Applicable
X indicates observations were made.
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the CSL criterion emphasized only a close final Tally-Ho range.
A third factor limiting the comparability of the two experiments 
is the manner in which 'killed" targets were disposed of. At NRL, 
because of the simulation technique, targets could not be faded after 
they had been shot-down. Crews continued to see killed targets on their 
radar indicators and the men were required to cease reporting these 
blips as hostiles. (in a very small percentage of cases--about 1 °/o 
of the 900 interceptions conducted— the manual system erroneously re­
evaluated killed targets and intercepted them a second time.) The CSL 
simulation technique made it possible to fade each target against which 
a satisfactory kill had occurred. Thus, as the Cornfield System per­
formed its mission, i.e. as it shot-down hostiles, the load on the 
system decreased realistically. This was not true at NRL. In the latter 
experiment the occurrence of kills made the task of the surveillance 
group— trackers and plotters— even more difficult in that there were 
three classes of radar pips to be identified and plotted: hostiles,
killed hostiles, and friendly interceptors. Operators in the Cornfield 
System had only the first and third categories to contend with.
Air Defense. Overall air defense capability of the two systems is 
shown in Figure 10. This is a frequency distribution of hits suffered 
per run for the manual system and all four intervention modes of Corn­
field. The average (mean) number of "hits" per run for each system 
was: manual = 2.70, Cornfield = 0.94. ,
Tbe proportion of critical targets killed inside the 30-mile defense 
zone being protected by each system is shown in Table 12. Note the
Table 12
Manual vs. Cornfield System; Percentage of Targets Penetrating
30-mile Zone
CORNFIELD
I II III IV
MANUAL
27.5 °/o 40.0 °/o 45.0 °/o 45.0 °/o 55-7 °/o
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relationship between performance, in terms of this criterion, and the 
degree of automaticity of the five systems. The best system— Mode I—  
was the most automatic, the poorest was the fully manual CIC. The 
difference between these systems was about a factor of 2.
Kill Range. Table 13 shows the average kill range, in miles, for 
each of the four Cornfield modes and the manual system. The very slight
Table 13
Manual vs. Cornfield System; Range of Killed 
Critical Targets in Miles (ifean)
CORNFIELD
I II III IV
MANUAL
35.2 32.6 29.2 30.9 21.6
differences between the intervention modes has been discussed earlier. 
Note here the approximately ten mile greater average kill range 
obtained by each of the Cornfield modes compared with that of the conven­
tional system.
Weapon Assignment. In at least one measure, the ratio of assign­
ments to kills, the manual system did not differ appreciably from the 
two least automatic intervention modes of Cornfield. This measure 
reflected, for Cornfield, the influence of uniquely human contributions 
to the system’s functions. With respect to the relationship between 
assignments and kills there was a close similarity between the two least 
automatic modes--III and IV— 8nd the manual system. This is shown in 
Table l4. Note how much more nearly alike the three right-hand figures 
are when compared with the more fully automatic modes.
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Table 14-
Manual vs. Cornfield System: 
Ratio of Assignments to Kills
CORNFIELD MANUAL
I II III IV
2.8 3-8 1.6 1.5 1.4
Survival. Survival time "was greater in all modes of operating 
Cornfield than in the manual system. Table 15 shows, for heavy load 
only, the mean survival times and dispersions around the means for the 
four modes and the conventional CIC. Variability was the smallest in
Table 15
Survival Time of Manual vs. Cornfield System: 
Minutes Before First Hit (Means and Standard Deviations)
CORNFIELD MANUAL
I II III IV
X 19.8 22.0 17.0 21.3 15.5
a 5*9 8.2 9.6 9.6 4.5
the manual system and was roughly comparable to that for the "hands- 
off" mode in Cornfield.
In summary, the following tentative conclusions may be drawn 
regarding the major similarities and differences existing between the 
Cornfield System and a present-day, conventional CIC:
1. Cornfield’s air defense performance was superior to that 
of the manual system: fewer targets penetrated the 50-mile and 10-mile
(lethal) defended zones and the average kill range was greater for the 
automatic CIC. Also, the latter system survived longer, i.e. before a 
first "hit" was suffered.
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2. The number of assignments made by CIC Officers, in Modes III 
and IV or Cornfield and in the manual system, were very similar.
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RESULTS: III. PREDICTION OF TARGET POSITIONS
As a task secondary to their major role of threat evaluation, CIC 
Officer-subjects generated "closest-point-of'-approach” (CPA) reports on 
all targets they considered threatening. Officers made predictions of 
range, bearing, and time of targets they had selected and they reported 
this information by telephone to an experimenter at a remote station.
Since all targets were preprogrammed, the true closest-points-of- 
approach were known. Analysis of these reports was done in terms of 
discrepancies between true and reported CPA's.
Frequency of CPA Reports. During the 32 runs of the experiment
a total of 248 CPA reports were made. The proportion of reports made
under each of the two target load conditions was not directly related
to load; i.e., although there were twice as many.targets in the heavy
load problem compared with the light script, CIC Officers averaged 8.3
*and 7.2 reports per run for the two load levels, respectively. The 
effect of intervention mode on the number of CPA reports made was more 
pronounced than that of target density. Table l6 summarizes the CPA
Table l6
CPA Reports: Frequency by Intervention Mode and Target Density
(Mean Number of Reports Per Run)
INTERVENTION MODE
LOAD I II III IV
LIGHT 8.7 « 7.0 5.5 7.5
HEAVY 13.7 6.3 6.5 6.5
* CIC Officers also made CPA reports in the NRL manual system experiment. 
In that study, officers averaged 4.1 reports per run (heavy load problem 
only). The fact that twice as many reports were made during Cornfield 
runs (irrespective of intervention mode) indicates the relatively greater 
burden of maintaining their own displays, keeping target status infor­
mation up-to-date, and other similar tasks in the manual system.
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report frequencies in terms of the intervention mode and target density- 
variables. Note the greater frequency with which reports were made during 
Mode I (fully automatic) runs compared with the remaining modes. This is 
a reflection of the fact that, in Mode I, CIC Officers had virtually 
nothing to do beyond monitoring the system.
The two CIC Officers differed in terms of the numbers of CPA reports 
they made: Officer A made a total of 151 reports (6l °/o) and Officer B
gave 97 (39 °/o) estimates. The difference was statistically significant.
There was a slight tendency for the frequency of CPA reports to 
increase as the experiment progressed. Of the total number of reports 
made, 44 °/o occurred during the first half of the experiment, 56 °/o 
during the last half.
Although their task was intentionally unstructured, that is, CIC 
Officers were not told which targets to report, the officers actually were 
quite discriminating in their selection of targets. Table 17 shows the 
proportion of all CPA reports which were made on critical targets. Note 
that for six of the eight experimental conditions over 70 °/o of all
Table 17
CPA Reports: Percentage of Reports on Critical Targets
INTERVENTION MODE ALL MODES
LOAD I II III IV COMBINED
LIGHT 77 % 71 % 68 °/o
0tr\t- 73.5 %
HEAVY 56 °/o 81 °/o 00 -p- 0 0 7^ °/o 70.I 0/0
CPA reports were made on critical targets. It is apparent, then, that 
the officer-subjects used a criterion approximating that of the exper­
imenters who developed the definition of "criticality" for certain 
*targets.
* "Critical" targets were those programmed to "bomb" the ship; i.e. 
they all had headings which took them within the 30-mile end 10-mile 
zones•
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Accuracy of CPA Reports. Two types of errors of CPA estimates were 
measured. One was positional error or distance in miles "between true 
and reported CPA. The second was an error of time estimate; this was the 
discrepancy, in minutes, between the time that the CIC Officer predicted 
a target would reach its closest point and the true time based on the 
script.
The range of positional errors varied from 0 to over 25 miles.
While the differences between average (mean) errors for the intervention 
modes were slight and not statistically significant, better (more accurate) 
performance occurred during the two more automatic conditions (Modes I 
and II). Overall position accuracy of reports differed between CIC 
Officers (mean error for Officer A =8.7 miles, Officer B = 5*7 miles), 
between load levels (light load = 8.4 miles, heavy load = 6.7 miles), 
and between the early and late phases of the experiment (9.7 miles and 
5.7 miles, respectively). The second effect, which showed greater accur­
acy under the heavier load condition, is an anomalism without apparent 
explanation.
Time errors in CPA estimates varied between -3*0 minutes (under­
estimation) to +8.0 minutes (overestimation). Table l8 shows the average
Table l8
CPA Reports: Time Errors (Lfean Absolute Error, Minutes)
INTERVENTION MODE
LOAD I II III IV
LIGHT 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.4
HEAVY 2.0 1.6 1.5 3.1
absolute time errors for the eight experimental conditions. Differ­
ences due to intervention mode, target density, CIC Officer, and prac­
tice were slight and statistically insignificant.
A comparison of CPA estimates made by CIC Officers operating with 
the manual system at NRL and reports obtained during the Cornfield 
experiment is shown in Table 19» The major differences in CPA
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Table 19
CPA Reports: Comparison of Cornfield and Manual Systems (Means)
MEASURE CORNFIELD MANUAL
No. of Reports per run 8.3 4.1
Proportion of critical 
targets reported o
oo Qk °/o
Time Errors 1.9 min. 1.8 min.
Position Errors 7*7 miles 4.3 miles
predictions for the two systems were:
1 * about twice as many CPA reports were made during 
Cornfield runs than in the manual system.
2. relatively more CPA reports in the manual system 
concerned critical targets.
3. position errors were greater, by about a factor of 
two, in Cornfield.
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RESULTS: IV. EFFECTS DUE TO CREW AND PRACTICE
The experimental design included provisions to examine both the 
effects of different crews and the practice on system performance. In 
the case of the former variable the two "crews" actually were simple 
alternations of the two officers between the billets of CIC Officer and 
Assistant CIC Officer. That is, during half of the runs Officer "A" 
served as CIC Officer and "B" was the assistant; the reverse assignments 
were made during the other 50 °/o of the runs.
Practice or learning effects were measured by re-running the entire 
experiment once. In other words, the l6 runs required to obtain one run 
under each mode-load-crew combination were repeated once in a different, 
and randomized, order. Practice effects will be reported by comparing 
these two blocks of 16 runs for each of several measures of performance.
Crew. Measures of crew effects include only those conditions of 
the experiment in which CIC Officers could have some influence on the 
outcome of the runs; therefore, no data from the fully automatic condition 
(Mode I) are included.
Of the seven major measure of system performance, differences 
between crews were slight in five. CIC Officers did vary in terms of 
the number of "hits" suffered when each crew was operating the system.
For both light and heavy target loads Officer ”B" suffered fewer "hits" 
than Officer "A". This difference was most pronounced during those 
conditions which placed the greatest amount of responsibility (and 
probably stress, too) on the officers. That is, during heavy load runs, 
and in intervention Modes III and IV, Officer "A" tended to perform less 
effectively than his counterpart..
Survival time, or number of minutes preceding the first hit was 
different for the two CIC Officers. Under both conditions of target 
load, the system operated longer before taking a first hit when Officer 
"B" was in charge.
Table 20 is a summary of the average (mean) of each of several 
performance measures sorted by crew.
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Table 20
Crew Performance: By Target Load (Means)
1
Measure Light Heavy
j_ A B A Bl
Hits 0.3 0.0 1.2 0.6
Survival 
(Minutes)
26.4 30.0 l6.4 23.8
Kills 7-5 9.0 14.5 13.7
<  30 Miles 1.2 1.2 4.5 4.2
Kill Range 
(Miles)
4o.8 59-3 30.0 31.9
Assignments 9-5 8.8 19.8 17.6•Targets Assigned
j------------------- .— -
9.7 10.0 18.8 16.2 |
In the case of CPA reports one of the officers— "A" was more pro­
ductive, tended to make better predictions in terms of time, but 
made greater errors with respect to position.
Learning. As in the case of the crew variable, learning or 
practice effects were negligible for all but two measures: hits
suffered and survival time. These two measures are, perhaps, of 
greatest operational significance. During the first half of the 
experiment the average number of "hits" per run was 0.75; during the 
last half of the experiment this figure dropped to 0.55« Survival 
time increased from the first to the second half of the experiment 
but only in the case of Mode II runs. The average duration of these runs 
increased from 22.8 minutes to 30.0, the latter figure indicating that 
the system was never bombed. (All data are exclusive of the fully auto­
matic condition, Mode I, in which no learning can take place.)
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*APPENDIX A: THE CORNFIELD SYSTEM
The Cornfield System consists of a complex of two radars, one 
special purpose tracking computer (TASC), a general purpose computer 
(ILLIAC), and several Charactron displays. The model is intended 
to study various phases of automatic detection, tracking, weapon 
allocation and control, and human monitoring and intervention.
Figure A-l shows a simplified schematic of the system. In this 
experiment only one of the radars was used as the source of friendly 
aircraft returns. TASC performs the tracking function with a track 
capacity of 500 objects. Each track has 21 extra digits allocated for 
identity, status, etc; thus a bookkeeping function is also performed 
by TASC.
The track information of x, y, x, y, and identity is transmitted 
via the Clear Picture Net to ILLIAC and the Charactron displays.
ILLIAC is programmed as described in Appendix B to perform automatic 
threat evaluation, weapon allocation, and weapon control.
The Charactron displays in conjunction with the keyset provide 
the links between the human operators and the automatic elements of 
the system. Each track is displayed via a positioned symbol with a 
velocity nose and a raster of twelve sexadecimal characters. Figure 
A-2 shows a display configuration of two hostile aircraft, one assigned, 
the other unassigned, and an interceptor on assignment.
The lowest row on each raster gives the Drum Address, i.e. the 
memory location in TASC. The top row indicates in order from left to 
right: 1. the identification (F-friendly, H-hostile, etc.); 2. the
nature of control (C-computer controlled, M-manual); and 3» the assign­
ment status (O-unassigned, 2-assigned). The information in the middle 
row of the raster depends on the class of object referred to; for 
friendlies, the three characters in the row indicate the specific 
identification number of the object; for unassigned hostiles, the 
characters indicate the value of threat as computed by the computer; 
for hostiles being intercepted, the characters indicate the specific
* Appendix A prepared by R. M. Brown.
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Figure A -2. Typical frock representations on the Cornfield 
Charactron display.
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identification number of the interceptor assigned.
For example, in Figure A-2, the track in the upper left hand corner 
is friendly interceptor no. 13.» headed on a south easterly course, on 
intercept mission under computer control, and located in the memory at 
address 342. The track in the upper right headed to the southwest is a 
hostile aircraft assigned to interceptor no. 13 and is located at memory 
address 236. Finally the lowest track indicates an as yet unassigned 
hostile headed north having threat value 29 and located at memory address 
176. Speeds of the tracks can be estimated by the length of the velocity 
vectors; e.g. track no. 176, showing the shortest velocity vector has a 
slower speed than the other two.
During runs, each track is displayed once each l-l/2 secs. The decay 
time of the phosphor preserves the image sufficiently to permit essen­
tially continuous reading. When tracks are very close to each other, 
their rasters can overlap; to reduce confusion, the operator can switch 
off the rows independently.
More complete descriptions of the system may be found in CSL reports.
* See: Nordsieck, A., "An Automatic Air Traffic Information and Control
System", CSL Report R-35; March 1, 1953; Confidential. Also, for a more 
up-to-date, but abbreviated, account, see Lawson, J. S., Jr., "Summary 
of the Cornfield System", CSL Report R-63; April 1955; Confidential.
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APPENDIX B: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ICON II CONTROL PROGRAM*
The control functions— threat evaluation, weapon allocation, and 
weapon control (vectoring)— are performed by a general purpose computer 
(ILLIAC) on the basis of information delivered to it from TASC, the 
tracking computer. ILLIAC performs these functions by means of a program 
known as ICON II. The description of ICON II which follows is divided 
into two parts:
I. A brief survey of the actions of ICON II.
II. A somewhat more detailed account of the logical rules governing 
the behavior of ICON II.
I. Brief Survey of ICON II.
1. Threat Evaluation. Every 1.5 seconds, ILLIAC estimates the 
threat of all hostiles on the basis of their range and closing velocity 
towards the defended zone. The estimated threat is used by the computer 
to eliminate non-dangerous targets from weapon assignment consideration; 
it also serves as a relative priority rating for hostiles, in case of 
conflicting demands on one weapon.
2. Weapon Assignment. For each sufficiently threatening hostile, 
the computer attempts to find that interceptor which can intercept the 
hostile in the shortest time and before the hostile can reach the defended 
zone. In the case of conflicting demands for a weapon, the decision of 
which assignment to make is based on the relative threats of the hostiles 
and the relative times required for interception. More details of this 
procedure can be found in part II. All weapon allocations are reviewed 
every 1.5 seconds to ensure rapid response to the overchanging battle 
situation.
3. Weapon Control. Every 1.5 seconds, the computer generates and 
transmits a vector message to each interceptor so as to direct him on 
a collision course to his assigned hostile. Unassigned interceptors 
are vectored back to, and then kept on, their appropriate CAP station by 
the computer.
* Prepared by P. G. Braunfeld.
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1*-. Human Interventions. The computer will receive and implement the 
assignments and other interventions made via a keyset by human monitors.
II. Logic of ICON II
1. Threat Evaluation. When an unidentified track first appears, 
ILLIAC defers processing that track for 7»5 seconds to allow manual identi­
fication. Thereafter, each track not positively identified by men, is 
treated by the computer as hostile. For each hostile, a "threat number" T 
is computed by the formula:
T = “ (R0-R)+Pvclosing
where R = 100 mi. o
R = range of hostile to the protectee (the "protectee" is a
carrier assumed to lie at the center of the "defended zone" 
discussed in the body of this report.)
v = magnitude of the hostile's closing velocity withclosing
respect to the protectee.
a,f3 are (preset) weighting factors.
Thus, the threat number, T, is a linear combination of the number of 
miles the hostile has penetrated into the system and its closing velocity 
with respect to the protectee. Clearly, a large T is intended to corres­
pond to a very threatening hostile, a small T to a less threatening one.
T is recomputed for each hostile every 1.5 seconds.
2. Weapon Assignment. Only if a hostile’s T exceeds a preset
threshold, T.. , is it considered sufficiently threatening to merit weapon th
assignment consideration. Such hostiles are submitted--one at a time-- 
to the weapon assignment routine. This routine attempts to find a "best" 
weapon (interceptor) for the hostile under consideration according to 
the logic outlined below.
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An assignment of a weapon to the hostile under consideration is 
called "possible" if the time required for the weapon to make the inter­
cept is less than the time required for the hostile to reach the protectee. 
Symbolically:
^friend^ ^hostile
where: t_ . , * t , + t ,,friend rot coll
t  ^ = rotation time (at 2°/sec) required to get on a rot
collision course
t =time required, once on course, to complete the coll
intercept.
Approximations are used throughout these computations to reduce program 
time. To each "possible” assignment, ILLIAC attaches a "figure of merit", 
F.M., via the simple formula: F.M. = tfrien^. Thus, "possible" assign­
ments are ranked according to the rapidity with which they can be completed. 
"Impossible" assignments are immediately rejected by the computer. At 
this point, the computer divides all "possible" weapons into two types:
a. free weapons - interceptors not currently engaged on a
mission
b. busy weapons - interceptors currently assigned to some other
hostile.
ILLIAC now searches for a "best" weapon of each type. The "best" free 
weapon is simply the free weapon with the lowest F.M.; the "best" busy 
weapon is the available busy weapon with the lowest F.M. A busy weapon 
is called "available" for the proposed assignment if it meets the follow­
ing two conditions:
a T ■>- T* proposed current
b. ■^ ‘^ ‘proposed ^  ^*^*current
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or, in words:
a. The threat of the hostile in the proposed assignment exceeds 
the threat of the hostile currently assigned to the "busy weapon, and
b. The proposed assignment has a lower F. M. (i.e. can be com­
pleted sooner) than the current assignment.
In case the computer finds both a "best" free and a "best” busy 
weapon, it must now choose between the two. After comparing the F.M.’s of 
the two "best" weapons, it will assign the best free weapon, unless the 
F.M. of the best busy weapon is significantly lower. Of course, if the 
computer finds only one "best" weapon it need not make this comparison and 
will simply assign whatever best weapon it has found. If the assignment 
falls to a busy weapon, it must first decouple that weapon’s old assignment. 
In making a reassignment of a busy weapon in this way, the computer makes 
no attempt to foresee what alternative assignments are possible for the now 
deassigned hostile. This deassigned hostile will come up for weapon 
assignment consideration in its turn within 1.5 seconds. If the computer 
finds neither a best free nor a best busy weapon by the above procedure, 
it makes no assignment to the hostile at this time. It will continue to try 
to find an appropriate weapon for that hostile every 1.5 seconds until 
some weapon becomes available.
The computer continues to monitor all assignments it has made 
as follows:
a. If, in the course of time, an assigned hostile’s threat 
should drop "too low" (i.e. T <  T ^  = preset threshold), ILLIAC will 
decouple the assignment.
b. Every 1.5 seconds, the computer will check each assigned 
hostile to determine whether the weapon assigned to it is still "best" in 
the sense of the rules described above. If an alternative (available) 
weapon is found to have a lower F.M. than the weapon currently assigned 
to the hostile, the computer will make all the required reassignments.
That such reassignments may indeed occur can be seen, for example, by con­
sidering that a busy weapon may, in the course of time, become free as a 
result of completing its mission. It may thereby become a considerably more 
favorable weapon to employ than the previously assigned weapon. Indeed,
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the continual monitoring and occasional re-shuffling of assignments may he 
considered the heart of ICON II.
3. Weapon Control. Every 1.5 seconds the computer transmits to every 
assigned interceptor a vector message directing that interceptor on a 
collision course to its assigned hostile. When the interceptor comes with­
in 5 miles of its assigned hostile, the computer transmits an "end of 
intercept" message to the appropriate pilot, erases the hostile track from 
TASC, and marks the friend "free". Unassigned interceptors, as had been 
noted in I, are vectored back to, and then kept on, their appropriate CAP 
stations.
I*. E^rnPL-n intervention. Within the framework of the logic described 
above, ILLIAC can handle any run of the type described in this report 
completely automatically. The only function which the computer is not 
programmed to perform and which therefore requires manual intervention is 
the re-identification of lost friendly interceptors. However, a keyset 
permits human monitors to make the following kinds of interventions in the 
course of a run.
a. Any hostile may be marked so that the computer will never 
assign it, no matter what its threat.
b. A hostile— previously assigned by the computer or not— may 
be assigned to any friend (free or busy). The computer will not decouple 
such manually made assignments until the interceptor has completed the 
desired mission. At that time, the computer will automatically erase the 
hostile and return the friend to the free category. If such a manual 
assignment is made on a previously assigned hostile or a busy friend, 
the computer will first automatically decouple all previous assignments.
c. A friend may be marked so that it will never be assigned 
by the computer to any hostile.
d. CAP stations may be relocated or reassigned.
e. The computer's vector messages may be overridden by voice
commands.
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The above explanations suffice for understanding Modes I and II of the 
Artful experiment. In order to accomodate Modes III and IV, the program 
is simply modified so as to bypass the appropriate subroutines.
Readers who are interested in a more detailed account of the rules 
governing the logic of ICON II are referred to the forthcoming CSL Report 
R-IO6.
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